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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:

New Ally for Leader of Soviet Revisionist Historians

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VIETNAM

DRV DEFENSE MINISTER GIAP REAPPEARS AT MAY DAY CELEBRATION

The conspicuous reappearance of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap at Hanoi's May Day ceremonies--a week before the 20th anniversary of his triumph at Dien Bien Phu--was the highlight of North Vietnam's otherwise low-key celebration of the holiday. In contrast with last year's May Day festivities, which featured an unprecedented military parade and a rally attended by nearly 100,000 people, DRV media indicated that this year's meeting was held indoors at the Ba Dinh Conference Hall and did not mention a parade. Opening and closing remarks were given by Premier Pham Van Dong and the main speech by Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet--a division of responsibility that was customary prior to the 1973 celebration, when Pham Van Dong delivered the main address and broke a 10-year precedent whereby the main May Day speaker had been a leader who was not a Politburo member.

During Giap's unexplained absence over the past seven months Hanoi has continued to publicize official messages attributed to him, and his undiminished official status was confirmed in Hanoi's report on the May Day meeting which listed him--with his party, government, and military positions--in his customary position after Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Although Giap last year delivered an unprecedented Order of the Day address at the May Day rally, it was not surprising that this year, in view of the reduced scale of the anniversary meeting, he took no active part in the proceedings. Giap was last reported in Hanoi during a brief period from 12 September to 6 October 1973, when he appeared in public on several occasions. Prior to that time he had been absent from public view since July 1973.*

Pham Van Dong's brief, routine remarks at the ceremony--broadcast in full by Hanoi radio--characterized the DRV's situation as "basically very favorable" following its "great victory" and the signing of the Paris agreement. According to Dong, the struggle to implement the Paris agreement against U.S. and Saigon "violations" has brought "success in the political, military, and diplomatic spheres." He repeated the oft-made claim that the "balance of forces is continually developing in favor of the NFLSV and PRG."

* For earlier discussions of Giap's absence, see the TRENDS of 28 December 1973, pages 14-15, and 6 September 1973, pages 11-12.

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Without going into detail, the Premier observed that the North is now engaged in developing its economy, developing its culture, and stabilizing its people's livelihood. While giving thanks in general to the "fraternal socialist countries, countries of the third world, and other nations" for their support and assistance, Dong neglected to single out the Soviet Union and China in this context as he had at last year's May Day rally when, in his main address, he devoted greater attention to foreign assistance.

Hanoi radio's excerpts from Hoang Quoc Viet's speech indicated that he rehashed the key points in the resolution of the 22d plenum of VWP Central Committee dealing with reconstruction in the North and routinely discussed the "present situation in the South." Viet denounced U.S. aerial reconnaissance over the DRV and accused the United States of "shirking its responsibility" for contributing to healing the wounds of war in North Vietnam.

DRV SHIFTS MORE GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, PROMOTES GENERALS

New shifts in the North Vietnamese Government and the leading ranks of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA), coming in the wake of changes in the government and in the Hanoi municipal party earlier this month, confirm that Hanoi is engaged in a continuing, far-reaching transformation of its postwar leadership.* The latest changes were revealed in a 26 April announcement of appointments and dismissals by the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee and in a 27 April report on a military cadres conference which revealed the first major promotions in the VPA for more than a decade.

MILITARY PROMOTIONS Hanoi radio's 27 April report on a "recently" held "military cadres conference" for the first time identified VPA Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung with the top military rank of senior general and listed the head of the VPA General Political Department, Song Hao, in the new rank of colonel general. DRV President Ton Duc Thang, who also attended the meeting along with First Secretary Le Duan and Politburo member Le Duc Tho, indicated in remarks to the gathering that other,

* Governmental appointments and dismissals announced in a National Assembly Standing Committee communique of 2 April were discussed in a supplementary article in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages S1-S3. The election of a new Hanoi municipal party secretary was discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 14-16.

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unspecified military promotions had also been conferred: "Our state has just decided to promote and bestow the general-level military rank on a number of comrades."

Van Tien Dung's promotion--confirmed in a report on his appearance at the May Day meeting in Hanoi--makes him the only North Vietnamese full general other than Giap.* In recent months Dung has been acting as a stand-in for Giap as top defense ministry representative at public functions during the latter's prolonged absence. The only known colonel general besides Song Hao is Chu Van Tan.

Both Dung and Song Hao were last previously promoted in September 1959, and Hanoi is not known to have made any change in the ranks of its generals since 1961. Whereas the current promotions were revealed by Hanoi only in passing, in 1959 a list of major promotions was announced at special ceremonies held on the occasion of DRV National Day. According to the 1959 report on the ceremony, the promotions were given in compliance with a decree issued by the DRV president on the basis of the "law on the service system for VPA officers" adopted by an April 1958 DRV National Assembly session.

GOVERNMENT CHANGES The most prominent change announced by the National Assembly Standing Committee was the removal of Vice Premier Hoang Anh as chairman of the Central Agricultural Commission. The announcement did not indicate whether he would be assuming new duties; however, he has retained his post as vice premier and was identified as recently as 16 April in his position as a member of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat. No new Agricultural Commission chairman has been announced. One of the two standing vice chairmen of the commission had already been removed earlier this month in a list of government shifts, released on 2 April, which announced the appointment of commission vice chairman Nguyen Van Loc to head the State Inspection Commission. The ranking head of the Agricultural Commission now apparently is its other standing vice chairman, Nghiem Xuan Yem, who has ministerial rank.

* The four VPA general ranks are: major general (thiếu tá), lieutenant general (trung tá), colonel general (thượng tá), and senior general (đại tá)--one, two, three, and four stars, respectively. Senior general rank had previously been granted in September 1959 to Nguyen Chi Thanh, a VWP Politburo member who died in July 1967.

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The Standing Committee also announced the removal of Nguyen Huu Khieu as minister of labor and Nguyen Huu Mai as minister of electricity and coal. Both were said to be assuming other, unspecified duties. Only the labor ministry position was filled, with alternate member of the VWP Central Committee Nguyen Tho Chan taking on the post of minister. Chan headed a department in the labor ministry in the 1950's. In the early 1960's he was a deputy secretary of the Hanoi party committee; he was identified as first secretary of Quang Ninh Province in 1962 and held that post until 1967, when he was appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union. After giving up the diplomatic post in December 1971, Chan was identified in June 1972 as chairman of the State Reunification Commission--an appointment which is not known to have been formally announced.* In July 1972 he was identified as deputy chief of the VWP Reunification Department; he is not known to have appeared in public after that until showing up at Hanoi's May Day celebration this year.

This latest series of changes in the government leadership has not ended Hanoi's reshuffle, since several positions now remain open. There are no announced chairmen for either the agricultural or price commissions, and the ministries of finance and of electricity and coal are now both without chiefs.

* The TRENDS of 10 April 1974, on page S 3, incorrectly identified Nguyen Van Vinh as having been chairman of the National Reunification Commission prior to the appointment of Dang Thi to that position on 2 April this year. Vinh had been chairman of the commission since 1960. He is not known to have appeared in public for the past six years, and it is not known when Nguyen Tho Chan may have supplanted him.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSCOW RETICENT ON KISSINGER TRIP, TALKS WITH GROMYKO

Moscow has provided only limited reportage on the Geneva talks between Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 27 and 28 April. Moscow's Arabic-language service on the 29th and 30th noted that these talks concerned both U.S.-Soviet relations, including the planned visit to Moscow by President Nixon, and the Middle East situation, and that both sides called for resumption "in the near future" of Geneva Conference meetings to establish peace in the Middle East. Initial Moscow comment on the Geneva talks was confined to a single commentary in Arabic for Middle Eastern audiences on 29 April. Apparently concerned to allay any suspicions that the talks might imply a weakening of Soviet support for Arab interests, Moscow has assured its audiences that the Soviet position had been coordinated with "Arab friends" and that the Soviet-U.S. contacts were taking place in accordance with existing agreements and were aimed at assisting "in solving the Middle East crisis on the basis of the well-known Security Council resolution."

Moscow has also refrained from explaining the purpose of Kissinger's current Middle East trip, although it noted that the United States and the USSR had agreed to keep in "close touch" in their efforts to arrange a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. As it has for previous Middle East visits by Secretary Kissinger, Moscow noted only briefly and factually his arrival in Algiers on the first leg of his tour, adding that he would also visit Egypt, Syria, Israel and other countries.

In commentaries disseminated on the eve of the Kissinger-Gromyko talks, Moscow reiterated strong support for the Syrian position on disengagement and previous Soviet warnings that the United States was trying to impose a solution unacceptable to the Arabs. PRAVDA commentator Pavel Demchenko wrote on the 27th that the Syrian Government had declared "quite justifiably" that it would not agree to any troop disengagement unless it includes withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territory seized in 1973 and 1967. In the Moscow radio observers roundtable on the 28th, PRAVDA foreign news editor Kolesnichenko asserted that disengagement should represent only "a first preliminary step toward a general settlement." Evincing some displeasure at recent U.S. diplomatic

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successes in the Middle East, Kolesnichenko contended that continued fighting on the Israeli-Syrian front contradicted Western claims that the United States had "to all intents and purposes managed to settle the Middle East conflict."

Commentaries broadcast in Arabic to the Middle East on the 26th and 27th, using the polemical style typical of such broadcasts, characterized U.S. policy as being aimed at avoiding a comprehensive Middle East settlement, at pitting the Arabs against one another, and at estranging the Arabs from the Soviet Union.

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EUROPE

MOSCOW HAILS PORTUGUESE COUP, CAUTIOUS ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENT

Moscow showed unusual alacrity in welcoming the 25 April military coup in Portugal, promptly broadcasting within hours of the event reports which reflected a favorable assessment of the course of events and of their likely outcome. Just a few hours after the coup began in the morning hours of the 25th, Moscow started publicizing factual reports on the developments of that day and continued this reportage over the weekend. On the 26th PRAVDA carried a signed commentary which correctly predicted the outcome of the coup. Apparently written while the result was still unclear, the commentary observed that the transformation of the army from a "prop" of the regime into its "open enemy" meant that the Caetano government was "doomed."

Although Moscow's reporting of developments surrounding the coup has continued to be favorable, it has evinced concern over certain aspects of the new Spínola government's program. Moscow has been critical, for example, of the new government's announced intention to maintain some sort of relationship with the country's overseas territories. And a May PRAVDA article by TASS political commentator A. Krasikov voiced concern over the vestiges of "fascist organs" of power and cited warnings by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) that the danger of a counter coup had not yet been fully eliminated. The subject of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Lisbon has not yet been broached in Soviet comment, although a TASS item on 30 April noted favorably that the Portuguese Socialist Party had called for the establishment of relations with "all" countries.

PCP REACTION Portugal's clandestine communist party was similarly quick and positive in reacting to the coup. In a broadcast carried by its clandestine Radio Free Portugal on the 25th, the party greeted the action of the armed forces movement as a "decisive step" toward ending the "fascist" regime and proclaimed the beginning of a "new political era" in Portugal. Echoing similar themes, the PCP Secretariat's 26 April statement, carried textually on the 28th by Radio Free Portugal and Moscow radio, specifically asserted that legalization of the PCP would be the "real test" of the establishment of democratic rights in Portugal. In a rapid succession of events, the party announced its reemergence into the Portuguese political arena.

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On the 29th representatives of the PCP participated in a national meeting of the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP). On the following day the party's secretary general, Alvaro Cunhal, was accorded an enthusiastic welcome on his arrival in Lisbon, ending a 13-year exile, and was granted a meeting with General Spínola. A Lisbon report on the 30th stated the official press organ of the PCP, AVANTE, would soon resume open publication.

MOSCOW DISPARAGES RESULTS OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Moscow, in limited comment on the informal meeting of EC foreign ministers held 20-21 April at Gymnich castle near Bonn, has presented a picture of continuing disarray in the EC and a failure of the meeting to achieve results. TASS on 21 April, citing "local observers," asserted that the British attempt to have its terms of entry into the EC renegotiated was made in "an extremely tense atmosphere."* A PRAVDA article by Ye. Grigoryev on 25 April characterized the meeting generally as an unproductive attempt to resolve a variety of conflicts evident at the last previous EC foreign ministers meeting held in Luxembourg on 1-2 April. Although quoting unspecified observers as saying the meeting had "opened up prospects for improving U.S.-EC consultation procedures," Grigoryev presented this observation as the sole positive result of a meeting that was characterized by persistent problems and "acute contradictions."

This picture is sharply out of line with the assessments provided by the West European press and by some of the participants themselves. The FINANCIAL TIMES reported on 22 April, for instance, that although no formal decisions had been made, the participants' remarks afterwards indicated the meeting was a success and could lead to a breakthrough in the "deadlock over consultations with the United States." LE MONDE on 23 April, referring to the "optimism and satisfaction" expressed by most of the ministers--especially French Foreign Minister Jobert and German Foreign

* The TASS report is almost certainly overdrawn. According to the London FINANCIAL TIMES on 22 April, the issue of renegotiation of Britain's membership in the EC was not discussed. DPA reported on 21 April that Britain had been asked to submit its proposal on renegotiation to the EC Council session scheduled for 7 May in Brussels. PRAVDA on 25 April stated that "according to a number of newspapers," the ministers preferred not to broach the issue of Britain's terms of membership.

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Minister Scheel--stated that the meeting had brought EC viewpoints "noticeably closer." It quoted Jobert as seeing "tangible progress" on the issue of U.S.-EC consultations and as being satisfied that a pragmatic case-by-case approach would avoid "predetermined theory or outline." On 21 April the West German press agency (DPA) quoted Jobert as saying that difficulties in U.S.-EC relations "had earlier been exaggerated."

Moscow has also reiterated its consistent complaint that West European concerns with specifically West European problems reflect a parochial outlook inimical to the broader interests embodied in CSCE. PRAVDA foreign news editor T. Kolesnichenko, for example, speaking on the weekly Moscow radio observers roundtable, noted that "many Western papers" have attempted to play down the importance of CSCE and that certain "fashionable theories" consider CSCE to play a small role in Europe "because European security has been superseded by other problems." Citing only the energy crisis and U.S. relations with West Europe as examples of these "other problems," Kolesnichenko concluded: "I think these attempts are calculated to distract the peoples of Europe from the main issue."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR TAKES STOCK OF YUGOSLAV POLITICS

IZVESTIYA political commentator Aleksandr Bovin recently returned from Yugoslavia with an object lesson for Soviet readers about the dangers of political and economic relaxation. However, the thrust of Bovin's 13 April IZVESTIYA report on preparations for the 10th congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) from 27 to 30 May was to convey general satisfaction that the Yugoslav leadership is coming to grips with its problems by strengthening party control over all walks of Yugoslav life, tightening party discipline and enhancing the role of the working class in the party and in society at large. Bovin's confident outlook clearly suggests a belief that the pendulum of Yugoslav politics is swinging inexorably in the direction of the Soviet political model.

The predominantly orthodox cast of Bovin's tour d'horizon nonetheless contained implications about the relevance of the Yugoslav experience for the Soviet Union, particularly in the realm of economic planning. While castigating the market mechanism as an ineffective and dangerous regulator of the economy, Bovin saw some merit in current Yugoslav efforts to treat planning as a "continuous process and counter-process" involving state agencies, industrial enterprises and local communities. Alluding to the adverse consequences of willful planning by the center--a phenomenon more relevant to Soviet than to Yugoslav practice--he declared, "It is known from practice that under certain conditions this process [planning] can succumb to the force of decisions taken arbitrarily."

ORTHODOX VIEW From a more orthodox position, Bovin identified decentralization as the root of Yugoslavia's economic, political and social ills. While conceding that postwar Yugoslavia, with its system of economic self-management, had achieved marked success in industrial development and in the material well-being of the people, he concentrated on the harmful political consequences. "In the hope for automatic progress of self-management," he pointed out, the role of the LCY was weakened and "spontaneous forces hostile to socialism" emerged to fill the political vacuum. Economic "free play," Bovin said, "nurtured bourgeois-liberal ideas of the 'free play' of forces in politics," which was manifested in regional and ethnic conflict. Eventually

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the Yugoslav leadership was forced to acknowledge the weakness of its liberal approach to economics and politics that was manifested in the "disastrous" Croatian events of 1971.

Treating Tito's reassertion of orthodoxy more as an accomplished fact than a policy goal, Bovin noted the measures taken prior to the congress to restore party discipline and restrict the scope of public debate. In particular, he looked with favor on Tito's attempts to "overcome views according to which the LCY can be regarded as a debating club where the coexistence of various ideological views is permitted." On the role of the Yugoslav party, Bovin quoted a statement by a low-level party official that "nothing can be done without the LCY," adding his own observation that "this is how all the communists whom I met think."

In discussing Yugoslavia's unique political institutions, Bovin displayed some reservations about the Yugoslavs' ability to solve their political and economic problems. For example, he regarded skeptically Yugoslavia's new legislative system based on elected delegates from basic organizations and local communities, and said it required "profound analysis" of its "positive and negative aspects." Moreover, implementation of centralized economic planning in a self-management system representing the "interests and programs of thousands" of industrial and communal units throughout the country was likewise viewed as the "central" economic problem of Yugoslavia.

YUGOSLAV REALITY Bovin's article is perhaps more a reflection of Soviet hopes than a description of Yugoslav realities. Attributing a dominant orthodox stance to the LCY leadership, he portrayed Yugoslav communists as intent on eliminating the use of the party by liberal elements as a "debating society" in which the party leaders could be attacked under the guise of "freedom of opinion." In reality, statements by prominent LCY leaders in Croatian party meetings earlier this year deplored the emergence of a "centralist" or "neo-Stalinist" faction in the country and strongly indicated that the campaign against liberalism and nationalism, in high gear since Tito's October 1972 disciplinary letter to party organizations, had gone too far.* These warnings were ignored by Soviet media, which have instead consistently and selectively publicized LCY leaders' appeals for strengthening the party's leading role. Thus, in reporting such an appeal by LCY Executive Bureau Secretary Dolanc, the 14 December 1973 PRAVDA ignored the proviso by Dolanc that the LCY must not, however, become "the administrative apex of the entire Yugoslav system." He added that this would amount to an "anti-leading role" and a denial of self-management.

* See the TRENDS of 13 February 1974, pages 19-20.

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LEADERS PRAISED SELECTIVELY IN SUPREME SOVIET NOMINATIONS

The Soviet press on 19 April began reporting nominations of candidates for the June USSR Supreme Soviet elections. While the relative numerical distribution in nominations of CPSU Politburo members was similar to the pattern of past elections, some notable changes in the apportionment of plaudits were evident. Whereas in the past TASS had limited honorifics only to the ruling troika--Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin--they have now been extended to a broader circle of Politburo members, with only Mazurov, Shelepin and Pelshe receiving no praise at all. In another departure from earlier practice, current nominations singled out the special "contributions" of individual Politburo members in policy-making, allowing the senior leaders to share in the credit for foreign policy achievements.

KOSYGIN SLIGHTED As in the April 1970 USSR Supreme Soviet nominations and the April 1971 CPSU Supreme Soviet nominations, Brezhnev was again clearly set above his colleagues, he alone being characterized as an "outstanding figure of the Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist and workers movement." On the other hand, Kosygin was slighted more clearly than in past elections. While Podgornyy and Suslov received accolades as "prominent figures of the Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist movement," Kosygin received a lesser honorific as "prominent party and state figure" or "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state," along with Kirilenko and junior Politburo members Andropov, Shcherbitskiy, Kulakov and Kunayev.

IZVESTIYA, however, using an account of Moscow city nominations written by its own reporters instead of the TASS account, repeated the TASS honorific for Brezhnev but placed Podgornyy and Kosygin on equal footing as "prominent political and state figures." TASS's slighting of Kosygin, compared to Podgornyy and Suslov, may have been partly offset by crediting him with contributions both to the domestic economy and to foreign affairs. Still, TASS again rated Podgornyy as an international leader and Kosygin only as a domestic leader in the second round of nominations--for electoral districts. The 26 April TASS report in PRAVDA on the beginning of district-level nominations repeated the 19 April characterizations of Brezhnev as an "outstanding" world leader and

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Podgornyy as a "prominent" Soviet and international leader, but this time Suslov was included as a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state" along with Kosygin and Kirilenko.

Kosygin was slighted even more conspicuously in his native Leningrad. Local nominations reported in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on 19 and 20 April characterized Brezhnev as an "outstanding figure" of "historic scale" who has achieved "big successes in detente," and Podgornyy, Suslov, Kirilenko and Kulakov as "prominent party and state figures," but they gave no honorifics to Kosygin and Shelepin. Nevertheless, the TASS account of the Leningrad meeting that nominated Kosygin added the title "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state."

Among other leaders, TASS termed Polyanskiy a "prominent state and public figure," Grishin a "talented leader and organizer, a figure of the Leninist type," and Gromyko a "diplomat of the Leninist school," while Grechko's "huge experience" in leading the armed forces was praised.

In contrast to the other 13 Politburo members, however, TASS reported no laudatory epithets or praise for longtime Politburo members Mazurov, Shelepin and Pelshe, even though Pelshe and Mazurov did receive them in local accounts of their nominations. While TASS characterized Pelshe as "one of the oldest figures of our party," the Latvian paper's account of his nomination in their republic called him a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state." While TASS reported Mazurov as being nominated after his junior, Gromyko, in his native Belorussia and receiving no praise while Gromyko received considerable tribute, the Belorussian press listed Mazurov's nomination first and labeled him a "prominent state figure." Some other republic papers also deviated from TASS's characterizations in reporting their local nominations. The Uzbek paper termed Podgornyy an "outstanding party and state figure" and the Lithuanian press called Suslov an "outstanding figure of our party and Soviet state."

"CONTRIBUTIONS" CITED A new element was introduced this year with the recognition of special "contributions" by individual Politburo members, especially in the realm of foreign policy usually credited mainly to Brezhnev. TASS reported recognition of Suslov's "big contribution" to "uniting peaceloving forces which are fighting imperialist aggression and to strengthening ties between communist and workers

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parties of various countries," Podgornyy's "contribution to strengthening peace and friendship between peoples," Kosygin's "big contribution to improving the administration of industry, improving planning and the strengthening of economic incentives for industrial production" and his "contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and detente," and Gromyko's "big contribution to strengthening peace." Gromyko was lauded at great length for his foreign policy activity in the local account of his nomination in his native Belorussia.

The relative status of Politburo members as indicated by the volume of nominations remained about the same as in April 1970 and April 1971, with only junior Politburo member Kulakov appearing slightly favored. The number of nominations reported on the pattern-setting initial day was as follows:

	19 April 1974	28 April 1971	25 April 1970
Brezhnev	23	17	19
Podgornyy	11	15	7
Kosygin	11	15	7
Suslov	4	3	4
Kirilenko	4	2	4
Kulakov	3	1	-
Pelshe	2	2	2
Polyanskiy	2	2	2
Shelepin	2	2	2
Mazurov	2	2	1
Grishin	2	1	-
Shcherbitskiy	2	1	-
Andropov	2	-	-
Grechko	2	-	-
Gromyko	2	-	-
Kunayev	1	-	-

BACKGROUND In contrast to the broad distribution of honorifics this year, the TASS report carried in PRAVDA on the first day of nomination on 25 April 1970 gave them to Brezhnev alone--as a "true Leninist" and "outstanding political figure." However, IZVESTIYA, which did not use the TASS account, reported

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concurrently that Kosygin had been called a "true Leninist, an important political and state figure," Podgornyy a "prominent figure of the Leninist Communist Party and Soviet state," and Suslov a "prominent party and state figure." The favoritism toward Brezhnev shown by TASS may have sparked controversy, because that glaring disarray was corrected on 30 April when PRAVDA's TASS account of the second round of nominations added epithets for Podgornyy--"important party and state figure, skilled, energetic leader" and Kosygin--"prominent party and state figure, skilled organizer".*

In the 1971 RSFSR Supreme Soviet nominations, in both the first round on 28 and 29 April and the second round on 6 May PRAVDA termed Brezhnev an "outstanding figure of the Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist and workers movement," while calling Podgornyy a "prominent political and state figure" and Kosygin a "prominent party and state figure." As in 1970, IZVESTIYA in 1971 carried its own account instead of relying on TASS, this time differing by omitting the epithet for Kosygin reported in PRAVDA's TASS account.**

KHRUSHCHEV ROLE IN VIRGIN LANDS CULTIVATION BELITTLED

The 20th anniversary of cultivation of the virgin lands was celebrated in March with great fanfare--but predictably with no credit for the project's initiator, Nikita Khrushchev. Adding insult to injury, an article on the virgin lands program in the March issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY belittled Khrushchev's role in his most famous project while making the first mention of his name in connection with the anniversary. The author, V.I. Kulikov, quoted an obscure 1967 scholarly work by S.L. Kovalskiy, published in Alma-Ata, which complained that during the Khrushchev years some authors "considered that the real history of the cultivation of virgin and unused lands began only in 1954, and the initiative in this big and important matter was attributed, as a rule, only to N.S. Khrushchev alone." Further, Kulikov complained that some authors had mistakenly asserted that the very idea of cultivating the virgin lands had originated in the 1950's, and as an example he cited a 1960 book by A.S. Shevchenko, Khrushchev's personal adviser on agriculture.

* For details, see the TRENDS of 6 May 1970, pages 30-31.

** For details, see the TRENDS of 5 May 1971, pages 26-27.

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Kulikov is a conservative historian who defended Stalin's collectivization policy against liberal historians in the June 1968 issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY.* In 1969 Kulikov joined Kovalskiy and several Kazakh scholars to produce a long book published in Alma-Ata on the party's campaign to cultivate the virgin lands; the book avoided any mention of Khrushchev. During the March 1974 anniversary ceremonies in Alma-Ata Brezhnev's role in the virgin lands project was greatly inflated. Some speakers, like Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov, even called Brezhnev the "organizer and inspirer" of the project.

* See the FBIS SURVEY of 18 July 1968, pages 31-35.

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NOTES

TITO VISIT TO HUNGARY: The 27-28 April visit by Tito to Budapest served both to demonstrate the good relations between Yugoslavia and its orthodox Warsaw Pact neighbor in the north and to underscore Tito's return to full vigor following his indisposition earlier this year. The visit, originally scheduled for February, had been postponed "for a little while" by mutual agreement. The rescheduled visit was announced by MTI and TANJUG on 22 April. The communique, released on the 29th, employed restraint in terming the atmosphere of the Tito-Kadar talks "cordial and comradely" and generally followed the line of the September 1971 Tito-Brezhnev joint statement in noting that the two countries' relations were based on respect for "sovereignty, equality, noninterference," and the "specific features" of their respective domestic and foreign policies. The very same formulas had been duly employed in the 1 October 1973 communique on Kosygin's visit to Belgrade, but not in the 15 November document on the Brezhnev-Tito talks in Kiev. Comment on the current visit included a reference in the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG to Tito's 15 April Sarajevo speech, in which he had insisted that, despite Western conjectures, Belgrade had good relations with both Hungary and the Soviet Union and had nothing to fear from Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

PRC ON INDOCHINESE SUMMIT ANNIVERSARY: Peking's limited commemoration of this year's anniversary of the April 1970 Indochinese summit conference followed the trend of recent Chinese practice toward reducing attention to Indochinese anniversaries. This year's comment on the summit anniversary was restricted to the usual 24 April PRC leaders' message to the leaders of the Indochinese "peoples" and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial the same day. Last year, by contrast, there had also been a Peking reception attended by Indochinese representatives and Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders, with a speech by ranking PRC military leader Yeh Chien-ying criticizing the United States. As has happened with other Chinese messages on Indochina in recent weeks, Peking also failed to provide the wide radio and NCNA publicity previously customary for the anniversary message--it has been heard only in Peking radio's services in Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian. This year's PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial criticized U.S. support for Saigon and Phnom Penh, but did not repeat last year's denunciation of U.S. "military and political schemes" in Indochina or demand that Washington abide by the peace agreements.

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PRC MAY DAY: All active Peking-based members of the CCP Politburo attended gatherings in Peking parks to celebrate May Day, and CCP vice chairman Li Te-sheng made his first public appearance in three months at festivities in Shenyang. Li had not been mentioned in PRC media for three months and had been the subject of unofficial poster attacks. Following the pattern established since Lin Piao's purge, there was no central editorial greeting the holiday. PEOPLE'S DAILY and other central newspapers carried large pictures of Mao and reprinted a number of Mao quotations that have recently been used to guide the campaign against Lin and Confucius, such as the injunction to "grasp revolution, promote production." Illustrative of the importance of this theme, much of the 1 May PEOPLE'S DAILY was devoted to pictures and accounts describing progress on the industrial front.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

NEW ALLY FOR LEADER OF SOVIET REVISIONIST HISTORIANS

The position of the independently minded director of the Institute of USSR History, P. V. Volobuyev, promises to be strengthened by the recent naming of a moderate, A. G. Yegorov, to head the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.* Volobuyev, author of a moderately revisionist history of the 1917 revolution, since 1972 has been under steady attack for allegedly distorting Soviet history and for refusing to admit his mistakes. The most recent attack on Volobuyev's deviations was made by the first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, P. A. Rodionov, in the March issue of that institute's publication QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. Rodionov's doctrinaire attack appeared before Yegorov was appointed as his superior and ideological overseer in the realm of party history, and the attack was undoubtedly overshadowed by Yegorov's appointment.

The failure to subjugate Volobuyev and the institute he heads provides a good illustration of the tenuous balance of forces currently at work in the Soviet political arena. In particular, it defines the limits on the power of reactionary forces led by S. P. Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee's science and higher educational institutions section, and P. N. Fedoseyev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and--until last November--director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Volobuyev, a specialist on the events of 1917, has in recent years advanced an approach to the history of the Russian revolution that minimizes the role of the proletariat in its preparation and stresses the elements of spontaneity in the Bolshevik rise to power--an approach in many ways reminiscent of Western historiography on the revolution. Despite numerous meetings organized by Trapeznikov and Fedoseyev to condemn Volobuyev, the reactionaries have been unable to engineer his ouster or to obtain a recantation of his revisionist views.

1972 ATTACKS ON VOLOBUYEV Volobuyev became director of the Institute of USSR History in 1969, at the relatively young age of 46, and in 1970 the institute published two books on the 1917 revolution, one of which he personally

* For background on the Yegorov appointment, see the TRENDS of 24 April, pages 10-13.

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co-authored. The books aroused considerable controversy because of their avowedly "new approach," and in April 1972 the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences recalled 73-year old ideologist P. N. Pospelov from virtual retirement to become acting academic secretary of the academy's historical division and to aid in the crackdown on historians. The history division set up a commission dominated by conservatives to examine the two books published by Volobuyev's institute.

At a meeting of the commission on 4 July 1972, reported in the January 1973 issue of HISTORY OF THE USSR, commission chairman B. G. Gafurov, director of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, reported to the history division that the two books contained ideological errors echoing--intentionally or not--the views of ideological enemies. At the meeting D. M. Kukin, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, accused Volobuyev of falsely claiming that Lenin had conceded that the working class had been unprepared to play the leading role in the October revolution. Kukin added that the books exaggerated the elements of spontaneity in the revolution and misquoted passages from the second volume of the official "History of the CPSU." P. A. Zhilin, director of the Institute of Military History, likewise charged that the books distorted Lenin's writings and downgraded the role of the proletariat in favor of the peasantry; he insisted on Volobuyev's public recantation. V. I. Bovykin declared that the offensive works were survivals of the Khrushchev period, when some historians followed the "very seductive" path of revising supposedly well-established views on important questions of history.

In reply Volobuyev acknowledged responsibility for the ideological content of the works under attack and admitted that the foreword of one had wrongly indicated that the proletariat had acted jointly with the entire peasantry, including the kulaks. But he defended the main theses of those works, insisting that the February revolution had been spontaneous, that the proletariat had been unprepared to play the leading role in the October revolution, and that there were "no ideological-theoretical errors" in the books. Presiding officer Pospelov closed the debate by rejecting Volobuyev's views, recalling his earlier errors and proposing a resolution censuring Volobuyev for refusing to admit his errors and criticizing the two books for rewriting history and playing into the hands of the regime's ideological enemies.

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Following the adoption of Pospelov's resolution, new pressures were brought to bear on Volobuyev. A July 1972 KOMMUNIST article by Moscow gorkom ideology secretary V. N. Yagodkin and a November 1972 KOMMUNIST article by Professor A. Smirnov criticized the work of the institutes of world history and of Soviet history under the Academy of Sciences. Ye. M. Zhukov, director of the Institute of General History, responded in the May 1973 KOMMUNIST, admitting that the above articles had correctly pointed out the "serious ideological and theoretical mistakes" in works by his institute. That Zhukov does not rank among the revisionist historians is clear from his attack in the February 1969 HERALD OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES on historians who allegedly try to "undermine principled Marxist-Leninist positions under the guise of speaking out against dogmatism" and who call Marxist-Leninist research "outmoded" because it does not rely on "structure analysis," "mathematical methods," and the like.*

Volobuyev, on the other hand, did not even reply to these criticisms. Nevertheless, in reporting Zhukov's reply, the editors of KOMMUNIST noted that a party meeting at Volobuyev's institute had discussed the critical articles and had called for "raising the personal responsibility" of the director and other institute leaders for the "ideological-theoretical level of scientific works."

Meanwhile, one of these two books was also attacked in a 13 October 1972 PRAVDA article by A. P. Kosulnikov, chief editor of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, and A. D. Pedosov, head of the faculty of party history at the CPSU Academy of Social Sciences and, since early 1973, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. PRAVDA on 6 January 1973 reported an evasive reply from Volobuyev and the party secretary of his institute that conceded the correctness of the criticism and revealed that the criticisms had been registered in the individual party record of the editors who had prepared the book's foreword. Apart from these concessions, however, Volobuyev stuck to the positions he took at the July 1972 meeting of the historical division, where he had refused to admit any other errors in the books or to recant personally.

Volobuyev continued to hold out, and on 21-22 March 1973 the CPSU Central Committee held a conference on history at which Pospelov, Volobuyev, and Kukin gave the main reports and Trapeznikov,

* For background, see the FBIS SURVEY of 22 May 1969, pages 25-26.

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Fedoseyev, Gafurov, Zhukov and others spoke. As reported in the May 1973 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, the conference again assailed the two books, criticized Volobuyev's statement that the proletariat "was not prepared for the role of leader of the new revolution" and, without naming him, attacked those still refusing to recant publicly.

In June 1973 Pospelov, on his 75th birthday, retired without having obtained Volobuyev's scalp. His position as the academy's historical overseer was filled by 65-year old archeologist B. A. Rybakov, who had played only a minimal role in the dispute. In a July 1973 KOMMUNIST article Trapeznikov assailed the Volobuyev version of the revolution and any other "new reading" of history. According to the November 1973 HERALD OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, on 14 June Moscow secretary Yagodkin had lectured the Institute of General History on the "ideological struggle in historical science" and the ideological dangers arising from detente. A samizdat version of Yagodkin's speech indicates that he assailed any deviation from orthodoxy in party history and warned strongly against any slackening of vigilance under detente. Significantly, he was not invited to deliver a similar address before Volobuyev's Institute of USSR History.

LATEST ATTACKS The most recent attacks on Volobuyev occurred at an 18 December 1973 joint meeting of leaders of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Higher Party School, dealing with problems of party history. The meeting, reported in the February QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, was keynoted by first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism P. A. Rodionov and also addressed by Kosulnikov, chief editor of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, P. A. Zhilin, Pospelov, and others. Although the brief reports published do not mention Volobuyev by name, he was clearly the target of Kosulnikov's complaint that some historians, departing from Marxist-Leninist methodology, had made serious errors in describing the grouping of class forces during the revolution. Moreover, Rodionov's subsequent article in the March issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY explicitly conveyed the views expressed at the December conference, and his article contained several unmistakable allusions to Volobuyev. Rodionov declared that the question of the proletariat's leading role during the revolution requires special attention, and that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism was presently helping Volobuyev's institute begin preparing a monograph on "The Party of Bolsheviks in the Struggle for the Hegemony of the Proletariat in the Democratic Revolution." Further, he assailed the "belittling

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of the role of the proletariat" during the revolution in some works as "serious deviations from Marxist-Leninist methodology" and as revivals of long rejected positions.

The March issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY also reported a 20 November meeting of the journal's chief editor Kosulnikov with readers in Kiev, at which the readers approved the journal's articles criticizing "some publications of the Institute of USSR History which contained serious methodological errors." This issue was composed at the end of January and signed to the press on 26 February--well before the appointment of Yegorov as director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 APRIL 1974

<u>Moscow (2388 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1148 items)</u>		
Komsomol Congress	(--)	27%	UNGA Special Session	(32%)	20%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	8%]	Cambodia	(3%)	9%
Lenin Birth	(4%)	8%	[Front Leaders in	(--)	6%]
Anniversary			Albania, Yugoslavia		
[Ponomarev Speech	(--)	2%]	Japan	(6%)	7%
Warsaw Pact Meeting	(14%)	7%	[PRC-Japan Civil	(4%)	5%]
[Soviet Party-	(--)	2%]	Aviation Agreement		
Government			Criticism of Lin Piao	(11%)	6%
"Approval"			and Confucius		
Supreme Soviet	(5%)	5%	Indochinese Peoples'	(--)	4%
Elections			Summit Conference, 4th		
China	(6%)	4%	Anniversary		
Middle East	(3%)	3%	Middle East	(1%)	3%
Senator Kennedy in	(1%)	2%	USSR	(3%)	3%
USSR					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.